The paper o¤ers a formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model to data. Under the model, the outcome of a new case is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior cases. The weights capture precedential in ‡uence and depend on fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the judicial hierarchy). The empirical analysis suggests that the model is a plausible model for the time series of U.S. maritime salvage cases. Moreover, the results evince that prior cases decided by inferior courts have less in ‡uence than prior cases decided by superior courts.
Introduction
This paper has two objectives. The …rst objective is to o¤er a formal model of ALR. The model posits that the outcome in the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior cases. The weight placed on the outcome of a prior case in the weighted average captures the precedential in ‡uence of the prior case and depends on the fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the judicial hierarchy) of the prior case relative to the case at hand.
The ALR model is closely related to the empirical similarity model of Gilboa et al. (2006) and Billot et al. (2005) , as well as the wider literature on case-based decision theory. 7 Case-based decision theory is a model of reasoning by analogy to past cases (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001) . 8 Empirical similarity theory is a closely-related model for real-valued assessment problems. Under the empirical similarity model, new assessments are made according to similarity-weighted averages of prior assessments. 9 In most applications of empirical similarity theory, the similarity function (i.e., the function that determines the weights in the weighted average) is symmetric-the in ‡uence of a prior case on a new case is the same as the (counterfactual) in ‡uence of the new case on the prior case. This is because the similarity function typically is based on a metric, usually a weighted Euclidean metric (e.g., Gayer et al. 2007; Lieberman 2010; Gilboa et al. 2011) .
In the ALR model, by contrast, the similarity function is asymmetric-the in ‡uence of a prior case on a new case is not necessarily the same as the (counterfactual) in ‡uence of the new case on the prior case. This is because the similarity function is based on a quasimetric, i.e., a function that satis…es the properties of a metric, apart from symmetry. This allows the ALR model to capture an important feature of reasoning by analogy in law, namely that precedential in ‡uence depends not only on fact similarity, which is symmetric, but also on precedential authority, which is not symmetric. 10 7 In case-based decision theory, the term "case" is used generically; it does not refer to a legal case. 8 See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995 , 2002 , 2003 and Gilboa et al. (2002) . Casebased decision theory was inspired by work on case-based reasoning in arti…cial intelligence (Riesbeck and Schank 1989) and harkens back to the notion that all human "reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy" (Hume 1748) . 9 Empirical similarity theory is related to various methods in computer science, statistics, and related …elds, including, most notably: kernel methods (Pagan and Ullah 1999) , which are commonly used in nonparametric estimation; nearest neighbor methods (Dasarathy 1991; Devroye et al. 1996) , which are commonly used in machine learning and pattern recognition; and conditional autoregressive (CAR) and simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) models (Banerjee et al. 2004) , which are commonly used in the analysis of areal and other spatial data. I expand upon the connection between empirical similarity theory and kernel regression in Section 3.2. For discussions of the relationship between empirical similarity theory, on the one hand, and nearest neighbor methods and CAR models, on the other hand, see Lieberman (2010) and Gilboa et al. (2011) . 1 0 Lieberman (2012) and Argenziano and Gilboa (2012) also feature asymmetric similarity functions, the former in a model of similarity-based autoregression and the latter in a model of history-dependent belief formation in coordination games. In neither paper, however, is the similarity function asymmetric because it depends on the authority of the prior case. In Lieberman (2012) , the similarity function is asymmetric because it depends on the direction of the change of the characteristics of a variable from The second objective of the paper is to take the ALR model to data. The data comprise the time series of reported decisions by federal courts in U.S. maritime salvage cases. 11 The …rst step of the empirical analysis is to embed the ALR model in a statistical model. The next step is to assess whether the ALR model is a plausible model for the data. I focus on two properties of the ALR model: (i) it is an autoregressive process and (ii) the process has a unit root. To investigate whether an autoregressive process could have generated the data, I estimate a linear regression model and test for autocorrelation in the residuals using parametric and nonparametric tests. To investigate whether the data has a unit root, I employ a "nearly e¢ cient" unit root test. The results suggest that the data are consistent with an autoregressive process that has a unit root.
The …nal step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the ALR model by maximum likelihood and test the null hypothesis that the similarity function is symmetric. This is the crucial step of the empirical analysis, as the key innovation of the ALR model, and the paper's main contribution, is the asymmetry of the similarity function. I …nd that the symmetry hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level. The implication is that precedential authority, and not just fact similarity, matters for precedential in ‡uence.
All else equal (namely, fact similarity), the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case that was decided by a inferior court is signi…cantly less than the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case that was decided by a superior court.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ALR model. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. In Section 4, I discuss certain limitations of the ALR model and the empirical analysis, as well as directions for future research.
The ALR Model

Legal System
Let K denote the set of judges or courts in the legal system. The courts in K are ordered in accordance with the hierarchy of courts in the legal system. Accordingly, I sometimes refer to K as the authority space.
Let Q denote the set of questions of law that may be presented to a court. For each question q 2 Q, there exists a set of conclusions of law Y that a court may reach with respect to question q. There also exists an array of issues of fact that the court must resolve in order to reach a conclusion with respect to question q. For each issue i, one time to the next. In Argenziano and Gilboa (2012) , the similarity function is asymmetric because it depends on the outcome of the prior game. 1 1 In Section 3.1, I describe the data and explain why I selected U.S. maritime salvage cases for the empirical analysis. there exists a set of …ndings of fact i that the court may make with respect thereto. Accordingly, each question q 2 Q induces a fact space = 1 n . Each element = ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 is a fact pattern. Given question q, the set of conclusions Y and the fact space are known and unique.
For example, consider the question of patentability under U.S. patent law. The authority space K comprises the U.S. district courts (at the bottom of the hierarchy), the U.S. courts of appeals (in the middle), and the U.S. Supreme Court (at the top).
The question of law q is whether an invention is patentable. The set of conclusions is Y = f0; 1g, where zero represents no and one represents yes. The issues of fact are whether the invention is (1) a patentable subject matter (i.e., a process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any improvement thereof), (2) novel,
(3) nonobvious, and (4) useful. For each issue i, the set of …ndings is i = f0; 1g, where again zero represents no and one represents yes. Accordingly, the fact space is = f0; 1g f0; 1g f0; 1g f0; 1g, and one example fact pattern is = (1; 1; 0; 1).
A case involving question q is a triple c = ( ; ; y), where 2 , 2 K, and y 2 Y. De…ne x = ( ; ) as the inputs of the case and y as the outcome of the case. The set of all possible cases involving question q is C = ( K) Y. I assume throughout the paper that the inputs and outcomes of cases are or may be represented by real variables:
At time t, a court is presented with question q and a body of evidence. Based on the evidence, the court makes …ndings of fact t 2 . The court has access to a q-relevant case history C t = (c 1 ; :::; c t 1 ), where c j = (x j ; y j ) 2 C is a prior case involving question q. How the court reaches its conclusion y t depends on its method of legal reasoning.
Under ALR, the outcome of the case at hand is a function of the inputs of the case at hand as well as the history of prior cases, y t = Y (x t ; C t ). 12
ALR Model
I model ALR as similarity-weighted averaging of prior outcomes. Formally:
where s : R n+1 R n+1 ! R ++ is a function that indexes the similarity between the inputs
x j of the prior case and the inputs x t of the case at hand. Equation (1) posits that the outcome y t in the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes y 1 ; :::; y t 1 of prior cases. The weight placed on the outcome y j of a prior case depends on the degree to which the inputs x j of the prior case are similar to the inputs x t of the case at hand.
The degree of input similarity is given by s. The greater is the input similarity s of a prior case, the greater is the weight given to the outcome y j of the prior case in the determination of the outcome y t of the case at hand. Hence, I interpret s as measuring the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case on the case at hand.
I assume that input similarity s-and, therefore, precedential in ‡uence-is an exponentially decaying function of the distance from the inputs x j of the prior case to the inputs x t of the case at hand:
The assumption that in ‡uence decays exponentially with distance seems natural and appears in other contexts.
For instance, Shepard (1987) derives a law of psychological generalization in which the probability of generalizing a response from one stimulus to another decays exponentially with the distance between the stimuli in psychological space. White (2001) argues that both theory and evidence support exponential decay of memory with distance in time Next, I assume that input distance is a proportional function, with proportionality factor v, of the weighted Euclidean distance d between the facts j of the prior case and the facts t of the case at hand:
where v : R n+1 R n+1 ! R ++ captures the precedential authority of the prior case relative to the case at hand and d : R n R n ! R + , which captures the fact similarity of the prior case relative to the case at hand, is given by
Note that the weights ! 1 ; :::; ! n in the weighted Euclidean distance d re ‡ect the relative importance of the n issues of fact that the court must resolve in order to reach a conclusion with respect to the legal question at issue.
In specifying v, I am guided by three criteria. First, all else equal, prior cases decided by inferior courts should have less in ‡uence than prior cases decided by superior courts.
At the same time, prior cases decided by coequal courts should have no less in ‡uence than prior cases decided by inferior courts and no more in ‡uence than prior cases decided by superior courts. Second, the in ‡uence penalty (resp. bonus) for prior cases decided by inferior (resp. superior) courts should diminish as the distance in fact space to the case at hand becomes large. This is motivated by the notion that the lesser is the factual similarity of a prior case (i.e., the greater is d), the less important is relative position of the deciding court in the judicial hierarchy. Third, the input distance = vd should satisfy all the properties of a metric, apart from symmetry. As stated previously, the key innovation of the ALR model, and the paper's main contribution, is the asymmetry of the similarity function. This is accomplished by relaxing the symmetry of the distance measure on which the similarity function is based. However, it is neither necessary nor proper to relax any of the other properties. Hence, the speci…cation of v should preserve these other properties, including the triangle inequality. 14 Guided by these criteria, I assume that v is given by v(x j ; x t ) = sec jt + tan jt ;
where jt = arctan
; 0:
Below I show that with v speci…ed by equation (5), the ALR model satis…es the …rst and second criteria set forth above. Moreover, in the Appendix I prove that the third criterion is satis…ed as well.
Before proceeding, however, I want to supplement the instrumental motivation for v with a geometric motivation. To draw an analogy between a prior case and the case at hand, a court has to traverse (metaphorically) the distance in input space from the prior case to the case at hand. The greater is this distance, the more strained is the analogy.
1 4 The third criterion rules out many otherwise desirable speci…cations of v. For instance, a simple way to impose asymmetry would be to de…ne v as follows:
(cf. Lieberman 2012; Argenziano and Gilboa 2012) . Under this speci…cation of v, however, = vd generally does not satisfy the triangle inequality on R n+1 (n > 0).
In input space (or fact-authority space), jt is direction from the prior case (the origin) to the case at hand, where the distance in fact space is given by d( j ; t ), the distance in authority space is given by ( t j ), and the radial distance is given by
That is, input distance equals radial distance plus an adjustment that takes into account both the direction and distance in authority space. The adjustment is positive if the prior case has inferior authority ( j < t ) and negative if the prior case has superior authority ( j > t ). It is harder to travel uphill than downhill. If the prior case has coequal authority ( j = t ), there is no adjustment and = d. The court only has to overcome any factual dissimilarity to draw the analogy. 15 Figure 2 provides a visualization of v. Observe that v = 1 if = 0. Thus, = 0 implies that precedential in ‡uence is symmetric, depending only on fact similarity and not on precedential authority. However, if > 0, then v > 1 if the prior case has inferior authority ( j < t ), v = 1 if the prior case has coequal authority ( j = t ), and v < 1 if the prior case has superior authority ( j > t ). Hence, > 0 begets in ‡uence penalties and bonuses for prior cases with inferior and superior authority, respectively, and thus implies that precedential in ‡uence is asymmetric. Figure 3 displays the relationship in the ALR model between precedential in ‡uence (s), fact similarity (d), and precedential authority (v). 16 The precedential in ‡uence of a prior case is greatest when the facts of the prior case are identical to the facts of the case at hand ( j = t , d = 0), and it decays exponentially at rate v as fact similarity decreases (i.e., as d increases). Both the precedential in ‡uence at d = 0 and the rate of decay for d > 0 di¤er depending on the precedential authority of the prior case. If the prior case was decided by a superior court ( j > t ), the precedential in ‡uence at d = 0 is the highest possible (s = 1) and the rate of decay for d > 0 is the lowest possible (v < 1).
1 5 In Teitelbaum (2013), I provide an axiomatic motivation for v. In brief, I show that the input distance = vd is a quasimetric induced by a skewed norm. A skewed norm is a positive de…nite function F (N; p)(x) = N (x) hp; xi, where N is a norm on R n , p 2 R n , and h ; i denotes the scalar product (Plastria 1992) . I then provide a "skewness" axiom that, when imposed in lieu of the symmetry axiom in the main result of Billot et al. (2008) , characterizes an exponential similarity function based on a skewed norm. The skewness axiom essentially postulates exponential discounting of the in ‡uence of prior cases with inferior authority relative to equidistant prior cases with superior authority. 1 6 Note that fact similarity and precedential authority are negatively related to d and v, respectively.
If the prior case was decided by a coequal court ( j = t ), the precedential in ‡uence at d = 0 is equally high (s = 1) but the rate of decay for d > 0 is higher (v = 1). If the prior case was decided by an inferior court ( j < t ), the precedential in ‡uence at d = 0
is lower (s < 1) and the rate of decay for d > 0 is even higher (v > 1). All else equal (namely, d), therefore, the in ‡uence of prior cases with inferior authority is less than the in ‡uence of prior cases with superior authority, and the in ‡uence of prior cases with coequal authority is greater than the in ‡uence of prior cases with inferior authority and not less than the in ‡uence of prior cases with superior authority. Moreover, the size of the in ‡uence penalty (resp. bonus) for prior cases with inferior (resp. superior) authority increases with the degree of fact similarity (i.e., as d increases) at a rate determined by (and positively related to) the parameter .
Importantly, Figure 3 illustrates that with v speci…ed by equation (5), the ALR model satis…es the …rst and second criteria set forth above. In the Appendix, I prove that the third criterion is satis…ed as well. That is, I prove that = vd is a quasimetric, i.e., a function that satis…es the properties of a metric, apart from symmetry.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, I take the ALR model to data. After describing the data, I embed the ALR model in a statistical model and assess whether it is a plausible model for the data.
I then estimate the ALR model by maximum likelihood and test the null hypothesis that the similarity function is symmetric (i.e., = 0) against the alternative hypothesis that it is asymmetric (i.e., > 0).
Data
The For each case, the data record the date of the decision, the court, 20 the award (in 1980 U.S. dollars), and the court's …nding on each Blackwall factor. The position of the court in the judicial hierarchy is coded as follows: district court = 0, circuit court = 1, and Supreme Court = 2. The Blackwall factors (other than the value of the property saved) are coded as binary variables: low = 0 or high = 1. This is for two reasons. The …rst reason is that courts routinely characterize salvage operations as "high order" or "low order." The second reason is that binary coding minimizes subjectivity and, therefore, Table 2 displays the mean award conditional on di¤erent …ndings on the Blackwall factors. For instance, it shows that the mean award for cases in which the labor expended by the salvors was low is $36,000, whereas the mean award for cases in which the labor expended by the salvors was high is $134,000.
1 9 These searches yielded 881 pure salvage cases from 1779 to 2007. Of these cases, 197 were excluded from the …nal data set because they were missing either a clear statement of the salvage award or clear …ndings with respect to one or more of the Blackwall factors.
2 0 The court is the court of …nal adjudication, and the data record the award and …ndings of fact as determined by the court of …nal adjudication.
2 1 The following procedures were followed in coding the cases. After receiving instructions from me, a research assistant read every case and hand coded every variable. In addition, I met regularly with the research assistant to review his progress and discuss any coding issues or questions. Finally, I audited his work by independently reading and shadow coding 15 percent of the cases. Our disagreement rate was zero with respect to the awards and less than one percent with respect to the Blackwall factors.
2 2 Though not shown in the table, it is worth noting that the award percentage (the salvage award expressed as a fraction of the value of the property saved) ranges from less than one percent to 85 percent, with a mean of 14 percent.
Statistical ALR Model
The …rst step of the empirical analysis is to embed the ALR model in a statistical model. Following Gilboa et al. (2006) and its progeny, 23 I assume y 1 = " 1 and
! y j + " t ; t = 2; :::; T;
where " t iid N 0; 2 for t = 1; :::; T . (Note that I include (! 1 ; :::; ! n ) in (6) to make explicit the dependence of s on the weights ! 1 ; :::; ! n in the weighted Euclidean distance d on which s is based.) Model (6) posits that the outcome y t of the case at hand is normally distributed around a similarity-weighted average of the outcomes y 1 ; :::; y t 1 of prior cases. To highlight two key properties of the model, rewrite (6) as
where i;t = s (x t i ; x t ) = P i<t s (x i ; x t ). From (7), we can see that (i) model (6) is an autoregressive process of order (t 1) and (ii) because the i;t 's sum to one for each t, the process has a unit root (Lieberman 2010) .
Before proceeding to the next step of the empirical analysis, let me say a few words about the relationship between model (6) and kernel regression. 24 Kernel regression assumes a data generating process of the form y t = g(x t ) + t ; t = 1; :::; T;
where i iid 0; 2 and g is an unknown function. A standard estimator for g is the Nadaraya-Watson estimator
where K is a kernel function and H is a diagonal matrix of bandwidth parameters h 1 ; :::; h n . Note the connection between (6) and (8) (8), which assumes that the data are generated by an unknown function g, whereas (6) assumes that that the data are generated by weighted averaging.
In other words, (8) speci…es a rule relating x t to y t , and thus assumes that the distribution of y t depends only on x t , whereas (6) assumes that the distribution of y t depends not only on x t but also on the history of prior cases, C t = f(x j ; y j ) : j < tg.
Plausibility of ALR Model
The next step of the empirical analysis is to assess whether the ALR model is a plausible model for the data. I focus on the two key properties of the model highlighted above:
(i) model (6) is an autoregressive process and (ii) the process has a unit root.
To investigate whether an autoregressive process could have generated the data, I 27 The test statistic is Q = T (T +2) P p j=1 2 j =(T j), where j the jth autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the residual series. Under the null hypothesis, Q is asymptotically distributed 2 (p). The Runs test is a nonparametric test that considers the null hypothesis that the residual process is random against the alternative of a nonrandom process. 28 The test counts the number of runs r above and below zero and compares it to the expected number of runs r. Under the null hypothesis, r = (2n 0 n 1 =T ) + 1, where n 0 and n 1 are the number of values above and below zero, respectively. The test statistic is Z = (r r)=s r , where s r = p 2n 0 n 1 (2n 0 n 1 T )=T 2 (T 1). Under the null hypothesis, Z is approximately distributed N (0; 1).
The results of both tests are reported in Table 3 . For the Ljung-Box test, results are presented for six and twenty lags, which correspond to the values suggested by Box et al. 2 5 More than 72 percent of the awards are less than the mean award ($74,000). 2 6 The log-transformation of the value of the property saved is not an arbitrarily imposed assumption; rather, it is the speci…cation selected by the multivariable fractional polynomial procedure of Sauerbrei and Royston (1999) . For details, see the Appendix.
2 7 The Ljung-Box test was proposed by Ljung and Box (1978) . For a textbook treatment, see, e.g., Johnston and DiNardo (1997) .
2 8 For a textbook treatment of the Runs test, see, e.g., Bradley (1968, ch. 11 ).
(1994) (who suggest minf20; T 1g) and Tsay (2005) (who suggests ln T ), respectively, and also for forty lags. In each test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the …ve percent level, suggesting that the data are consistent with an autoregressive process.
To investigate whether the data generating process has a unit root, I employ the ADF-GLS test proposed by Elliott et al. (1996) . The ADF-GLS test is an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test in which the time series is detrended via generalized least squares (GLS). 29 The ADF-GLS test is "nearly e¢ cient" in the sense that its asymptotic local power functions are virtually indistinguishable from the Gaussian power envelope, and has greater power than the standard ADF test (which is not "nearly e¢ cient") (Haldrup and Jansson 2006) . The test proceeds in two steps. First, it estimates in the regression y t y t 1 = (1 ) + v t , where = 1 7=T . Second, it estimates in the regression e y t = e y t 1 + P p j=1 j e y t j +u t , where e y t = e y t e y t 1 , e y t = y t b , and b is the estimate of obtained in the …rst step. The test statistic is the ordinary t statistic for = 0. The results of ADF-GLS test are reported in Table 3 . Results are presented for forty lags, which corresponds to the value suggested by both the sequential t criterion proposed by Ng and Perron (1995) and the modi…ed Akaike information criterion (MAIC) proposed by Ng and Perron (2000) . The test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the …ve percent level, suggesting that the data are consistent with a unit root process.
Of course, the results of the autocorrelation and unit root tests reported in Table 3 provide only indirect, negative assurance that the ALR model is a plausible model for the data. The autocorrelation tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals from the linear regression model are not autocorrelated, and the unit root test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the data generating process has a unit root. These results are consistent with a data generating process that is autoregressive and has a unit root, but they do not a¢ rmatively establish that the data were generated by such a process, let alone by the ALR model. Indeed, it is important to highlight two limitations of the analysis. First, the Ljung-Box test and the ADF-GLS test contemplate a …xed order autoregressive process, 30 and thus can provide only oblique evidence with respect to the ALR model, which is an autoregressive process of increasing order. 31 Second, although the ADF-GLS test is "nearly e¢ cient" and has greater power than the standard ADF test, it has low power in the present context. To get a sense of the test's power, I performed 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations in which I …rst generated simulated data under the alternative hypothesis that the data generating process is the linear regression model estimated above and then tested for a unit root using the ADF-GLS test. 32 At the …ve percent level, the test correctly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root 195 times out of 1,000, implying a power of 19.5 percent.
That said, the Runs test is more generally applicable, as it is nonparametric and makes no assumptions about the data generating process. Indeed, not only does the Runs test on the residuals of the linear regression model reject the null hypothesis of randomness, which provides negative assurance on the plausibility of the ALR model, but a Runs test on the residuals of the …tted ALR model (see Section 3.4) fails to reject the null hypothesis of randomness, which provides positive assurance. 33
Testing the Symmetry of the Similarity Function
The …nal step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the model by maximum likelihood and test the hypothesis = 0 against the alternative > 0, i.e., test the hypothesis that the similarity function s is symmetric against the alternative that s is asymmetric. As stated previously, this is the crucial step, as the key innovation of the ALR model, and the paper's main contribution, is the asymmetry of the similarity function.
The loglikelihood function is :
Recall that is the shape parameter for the precedential authority function v de…ned in equation (5), ! 1 ; :::; ! n are the weights in the Euclidean distance function d de…ned in equation (4), and 2 is the variance of the error term " t in equation (6). For the derivation 3 2 To generate each simulated data set, I performed two steps. First, I sampled 684 residuals from a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation set equal to the root mean squared error of the residuals from the linear regression model estimated above. Second, I used the …tted regression line and the simulated residuals to generate 684 simulated awards, one for each observation in the data. To select the number of lags for each ADF-GLS test, I took the greater of (i) the value suggested by the sequestial t criterion and (ii) the value suggested by the MAIC.
3 3 The test statistic is 1:543, whereas the …ve percent critical value is 1:645.
of the loglikelihood function, as well as an explication of the asymptotic theory of model (6), which establishes a theoretical basis for simple hypothesis tests involving the model parameters, see Lieberman (2010) . Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters. Note that in the estimation both the award (y) and the value of the property saved (x 5 ) are log-transformed. The estimates for ! 1 ; :::; ! 6 suggest that each of the Blackwall factors, save only the skill displayed by the salvors (x 2 ), is statistically signi…cant to the determination of the award. They also suggest that the factors which receive the greatest weight are the labor expended by the salvors (x 1 ), the value of the property saved (x 5 ), and the danger to the property saved (x 6 ), and that the factors which receive the least weight are the skill displayed by the salvors (x 2 ), the danger to the salvors'
property (x 3 ), and the risk incurred by the salvors (x 4 ). In addition, the estimate for 2 suggests that unobserved heterogeneity in salvage awards has unit variance.
Most importantly, the estimate for is 0:036 with a standard error of 0:017, and the hypothesis = 0 is rejected in favor of the alternative > 0 at the one percent level. That is, I …nd that the similarity function is asymmetric, with signi…cant in ‡uence penalties and bonuses for cases decided by inferior and superior courts, respectively (see Figure 4 ). The implication is that precedential authority, and not just fact similarity, matters for precedential in ‡uence. All else equal, the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case that was decided by an inferior court is signi…cantly less than the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case that was decided by a coequal court, which in turn is signi…cantly less than the precedential in ‡uence of a prior case that was decided by a superior court.
Discussion
The use of analogical reasoning in law is a central topic in the jurisprudence and arti…cial intelligence and law literatures. Contributing to these literatures, this paper presents a formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model to data. The ALR model posits that the outcome of the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior cases, where the weights are a function of the fact similarity and precedential authority of the prior cases. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the ALR model is a plausible model for the time series of reported decisions by federal courts in U.S. maritime salvage cases. What's more, the results indicate that the similarity function is asymmetric, a¢ rming that precedential in ‡uence indeed depends not only on fact similarity, which is symmetric, but also on precedential authority, which is not.
The ALR model and the empirical analysis, however, are subject to several important limitations. First, the ALR model is a stylized representation of analogical legal reasoning in its purest form-the judge reasons directly from case to case without invoking a governing legal rule. A model that combines elements of analogical and rule-based legal reasoning may be more realistic. In future research, it would be interesting to explore a hybrid ALR-RLR model, perhaps along the lines of a mixed SAR model (Anselin 1988) .
Second, the ALR model speci…es a particular method of assessment (similarityweighted averaging of all prior cases), as well as a speci…c notion of similarity (exponentially decaying function of asymmetric weighted Euclidean distance). Although I would argue that any model of ALR must involve some similarity-weighted statistic of the outcomes of prior cases, statistics other than the mean-e.g., the median or the mode-are plausible alternatives. Another plausible alternative is a similarity-weighted statistic of selected prior cases (as opposed to all prior cases)-e.g., the k-nearest cases. 34 Furthermore, one could specify other similarity functions (e.g., s = 1=(1 + )), 35 other precedential authority functions, 36 or other distance functions (e.g., d(a; b) = P n i=1 ! i ja i b i j). 37 Third, the ALR model takes a representative agent approach and assumes that all judges are equipped with the same similarity function. Allowing for heterogeneous judges surely would be more realistic. However, tractability would require making strong assumptions about the structure of such heterogeneity.
Fourth, the empirical analysis relies on data that records the inputs and outcomes of legal cases. Such data can provide only indirect evidence regarding the method of legal reasoning. 38 Nevertheless, it arguably is the best available evidence. In many cases, a court's written opinion o¤ers no direct evidence regarding the method of legal reasoning. Even in cases in which the court's opinion o¤ers some direct evidence, it rarely is de…nitive and, in any event, it arguably is of little probative value. 39 Lastly, the empirical analysis speaks only to whether the ALR model is a plausible model for the time series of outcomes in U.S. maritime salvage cases. It says nothing about whether it is a plausible model for case outcomes in other areas of law. 40 Furthermore, the fact the ALR model is a legalist model of judicial behavior suggests that it may not be well suited to other areas of law, including, in particular, politically charged areas (to which we might expect attitudinal or strategic models to be better suited). 41 All of that said, I believe that taking a formal modeling approach to ALR helps sharpen ideas not just about ALR but also about RLR, and suggests ways to distinguish them theoretically. For instance, the model of the legal environment in Section 2.1 suggests a way to theoretically distinguish ALR and RLR: under ALR the outcome of the case at hand is a function of the inputs of the case at hand as well as the history of prior cases, y t = Y (x t ; C t ), whereas under RLR the outcome of the case at hand is a function of the inputs only, y t = Y (x t ). Stated another way, under RLR the outcome depends on a bounded number of parameters, whereas under ALR the number of parameters increases with the prior case history (cf. Gayer et al. 2007 ). In addition, the mathematical kinship between the ALR model and kernel regression highlighted in Section 3.2 suggests a theoretical connection between ALR and RLR: under ALR, although the judge "does not explicitly resort to general rules and theories," she "can be viewed as someone who believes in a general rule of the form Y = f (X 1 ; :::; X m ) but does not know the functional form of f and therefore attempts to estimate it by nonparametric techniques" (Gilboa et al. 2006) . It also suggests a theoretical distinction: ALR posits that the data are generated by weighted averaging, whereas RLR posits that the data are generated by a rule and uses weighted averaging as a statistical technique to estimate the rule. In future research, it would be valuable to explore whether these connections and distinctions could be leveraged to develop a way to empirically distinguish ALR and RLR.
(iii) Take any x 2 R n+1 . To prove that satis…es the triangle inequality, we must show that (x j ; x t ) (x j ; x) + (x; x t ). The condition holds if and only if
:
holds because f is a metric on R n+1 . Hence, the condition holds.
B Selection of ln x 5 by multivariable fractional polynomial regression
As stated in footnote 26, the log-transformation of the value of the property saved (x 5 ) is the speci…cation selected by the multivariable fractional polynomial (MFP) procedure of Sauerbrei and Royston (1999) . 42 The following is a brief summary of the MFP procedure.
For a textbook treatment, see Royston and Altman (1994, ch. 6) .
The standard MFP regression model may be expressed as The MFP algorithm selects the covariates and the powers p 1 ; :::; p m for the continuous covariates. The researcher prede…nes the set of potential covariates, the set of potential powers, denoted P, and the maximum degree of the fractional polynomial, denoted M .
The researcher also prede…nes two signi…cance levels: 1 , which determines the critical value for variable selection; and 2 , which determines the critical value for power selection. The covariates are selected using a backward elimination procedure in which the potential covariates are iteratively removed and added based a sequence of signi…cance tests at level 1 . The powers are selected using a closed test procedure in which an M degree fractional polynomial is tested at level 2 against a linear model and then, if and as necessary, against increasingly complex fractional polynomials. Once the covariates and powers are selected, the parameter vector is estimated by maximum likelihood.
To select the speci…cation for the value of the property saved (x 5 ), which is the only continuous covariate, I ran an MFP regression in which the dependent variable is the logtransformed salvage award, the set of potential covariates comprises the six Blackwall factors, the set of potential powers is P = f 4; 3; 2; 1; 1 2 ; 0; 1 2 ; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g, the maximum degree of the fractional polynomial is M = 5, the signi…cance level for covariate selection is 1 = 1, and the signi…cance level for power selection is 2 = 0:05.
Note that setting 1 = 1 forces the MFP algorithm to select all the covariates into the model, which is justi…ed here by the doctrinal principle that courts are bound to apply all of the Blackwall factors in determining salvage awards. Although the model allows for a …ve-degree fractional polynomial in x 5 with powers ranging from 4 to 8, the MFP algorithm selects a one-degree fractional polynomial with power zero, which corresponds to a simple log transformation. For further details, see Teitelbaum (forthcoming) . Thick: = 0:036, j t j j = 0 Thin: = 0:036, j t j j = 1 Dash:
= 0:036, j t j j = 2 
